One way to provide fault isolation among cooperating software modules is to place each in its own address space. However, for tightly-coupled modules, this solution incurs prohibitive context switch overhead, In this paper, we present a software approach to implementing fault isolation within a single address space. Our approach has two parts. First, we load the code and data for a distrusted module into its own fault domain, a logically separate portion of the application's address space. Second, we modify the object code of a distrusted module to prevent it from writing or jumping to an address outside its fault domain. Both these software operations are portable and programming language independent.
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Our approach poses a tradeoff relative to hardware fault isolation: substantially faster communication between fault domains, at a cost of slightly increased execution time for distrusted modules. We demonstrate that for frequently communicating modules, implementing fault isolation in software rather than hardware can substantially improve end-to-end application performance. identifiers, and two are used to hold the sandboxed code and data addresses.
Optimization
The overhead of software encapsulation can be reduced by using conventional compiler optimizations. 
Process Resources
Because multiple fault domains share the same virtual address space, the fault domain implementation must prevent distrusted modules from corrupting resources that are allocated on a per-address-space basis. For example, if a fault domain is allowed to make system calls, it can close or delete files needed by other code executing in the address space, potentially causing the application as a whole to crash.
One solution is to modify the operating system to know about fault domains.
On a system call or page fault, the kernel can use the program counter to determine the currently executing fault domain, and restrict resources accordingly. The model provides an effective way to separate known sources of overhead from second order effects.
column 5 of Table 1 are the predicted overheads.
As can be seen from 
Fault Domain Crossing
We now turn to the cost of cross-fault-domain RPC. Our RPC mechanism spends most of its time saving and restoring registers. As detailed in Section 4, only registers that are designated by the architecture to be preserved across procedure calls need to be saved. In addition, if no instructions in the callee fault domain modify a preserved register then it does not need to be saved. Table  2 ). In addition, we instrumented the code to count the number of crossfault-domain RPCS so that we could estimate the performance of fault isolation based on separate address spaces. [Ass91]
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